Virtuous oc tools

As always Akshat, exellent review of available GPU overclocking soft. Thanks a lot for everything you do for PC enthusiast community.

Thank you in advance if you know. Yo bro! Interesting info there. Why is it so? What do you suggest I do?? Help me out here man! I appreciate. Hey, I was curious if you know of any third party software I could use to update the tuning on my Radeon RX card. Thanks for the reply. I think what was happening is that I had the voltage set too low, so it would jump up when some error occurred.

I just raised the voltage up, and now it appears to not be doing that anymore. Notify me by email when the comment gets approved. Related Posts. Akshat Verma March 11, You are very welcome. JS May 18, Akshat Verma May 18, JS May 19, Thank you. Aj August 27, Good job man, putting these altogether.

Thank you! Benjamin Asare October 27, Akshat Verma October 28, Well, you have to upgrade your CPU. Benjamin Asare October 28, To set the stage, the first section discusses the public interest case for digital money. The second section lays out the unique properties of CBDCs as an advanced representation of central bank money, focusing on their role as a means of payment and comparing them with cash and the latest generation of retail FPS.

The third section discusses the appropriate division of labour between the central bank and the private sector in payments and financial intermediation, and the associated CBDC design considerations.

The fourth section explores the principles behind design choices on digital identification and user privacy. The fifth section discusses the international dimension of CBDCs, including the opportunities for improving cross-border payments and the role of international cooperation.

Throughout the long arc of history, money and its institutional foundations have evolved in parallel with the technology available. Many recent payment innovations have built on improvements to underlying infrastructures that have been many years in the making. Central banks around the world have instituted real-time gross settlement RTGS systems over the past decades.

A growing number of jurisdictions over 55 at the time of writing 3 have introduced retail FPS, which allow instant settlement of payments between households and businesses around the clock. FPS also support a vibrant ecosystem of private bank and non-bank payment service providers PSPs, see glossary.

These developments show how innovation can thrive on the basis of sound money provided by central banks. Yet further-reaching changes to the existing monetary system are burgeoning. Demands on retail payments are changing, with fewer cash transactions and a shift towards digital payments, in particular since the start of the Covid pandemic Graph III 1 , left-hand and centre panels.

In addition to incremental improvements, many central banks are actively engaged in work on CBDCs as an advanced representation of central bank money for the digital economy. CBDCs may give further impetus to innovations that promote the efficiency, convenience and safety of the payment system.

The overriding criterion when evaluating a change to something as central as the monetary system should be whether it serves the public interest. Here, the public interest should be taken broadly to encompass not only the economic benefits flowing from a competitive market structure, but also the quality of governance arrangements and basic rights, such as the right to data privacy. It is in this context that the exploration of CBDCs provides an opportunity to review and reaffirm the public interest case for digital money.

The monetary system is a public good that permeates people's everyday lives and underpins the economy. Technological development in money and payments could bring wide benefits, but the ultimate consequences for the well-being of individuals in society depend on the market structure and governance arrangements that underpin it. The same technology could encourage either a virtuous circle of equal access, greater competition and innovation, or it could foment a vicious circle of entrenched market power and data concentration.

The outcome will depend on the rules governing the payment system and whether these will result in open payment platforms and a competitive level playing field. Central bank interest in CBDCs comes at a critical time. Several recent developments have placed a number of potential innovations involving digital currencies high on the agenda.

The first of these is the growing attention received by Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies; the second is the debate on stablecoins; and the third is the entry of large technology firms big techs into payment services and financial services more generally. By now, it is clear that cryptocurrencies are speculative assets rather than money, and in many cases are used to facilitate money laundering, ransomware attacks and other financial crimes.

Stablecoins attempt to import credibility by being backed by real currencies. As such, these are only as good as the governance behind the promise of the backing. In any case, to the extent that the purported backing involves conventional money, stablecoins are ultimately only an appendage to the conventional monetary system and not a game changer.

Perhaps the most significant recent development has been the entry of big techs into financial services. Their business model rests on the direct interactions of users, as well as the data that are an essential by-product of these interactions. As big techs make inroads into financial services, the user data in their existing businesses in e-commerce, messaging, social media or search give them a competitive edge through strong network effects.

The more users flock to a particular platform, the more attractive it is for a new user to join that same network, leading to a "data-network-activities" or "DNA" loop see glossary.

However, the network effects that underpin big techs can be a mixed blessing for users. On the one hand, the DNA loop can create a virtuous circle, driving greater financial inclusion, better services and lower costs. On the other, it impels the market for payments towards further concentration. Entrenchment of market power may potentially exacerbate the high costs of payment services, still one of the most stubborn shortcomings of the existing payment system.

An example is the high merchant fees associated with credit and debit card payments. Despite decades of ever-accelerating technological progress, which has drastically reduced the price of communication equipment and bandwidth, the cost of conventional digital payment options such as credit and debit cards remains high, and still exceeds that of cash Graph III.

These costs are not immediately visible to consumers. Charges are usually levied on the merchants, who are often not allowed to pass these fees directly on to the consumer. However, the ultimate incidence of these costs depends on what share of the merchant fees are passed on to the consumer indirectly through higher prices. As is well known in the economics of indirect taxation, the individuals who ultimately bear the incidence of a tax may not be those who are formally required to pay that tax.

Related to the persistently high cost of some digital payment options is the lack of universal access to digital payment services. Access to bank and non-bank transaction accounts has improved dramatically over the past several decades, in particular in emerging market and developing economies EMDEs. Even in advanced economies, some users lack payment cards and smartphones to make digital payments, participate in e-commerce and receive transfers such as government-to-person payments.

Due in part to market power and low expected margins, private PSPs often do not cater sufficiently to these groups. Remedies may necessitate public policy support as digital payments become more dominant. The availability of massive amounts of user data gives rise to another important issue — that of data governance. Access to data confers competitive advantages that may entrench market power.

Beyond the economic consequences, ensuring privacy against unjustified intrusion by both commercial and government actors has the attributes of a basic right. For these reasons, the issue of data governance has emerged as a key public policy concern.

When US consumers were asked in a representative survey whom they trust with safeguarding their personal data, the respondents reported that they trust big techs the least Graph III. They have far more trust in traditional financial institutions, followed by government agencies and fintechs. Similar patterns are present in other countries right-hand panel. The survey reveals a number of concerns, but the potential for abuse of data emerges as an important element.

A later section of this chapter discusses data governance issues more fully. The foundation of the monetary system is trust in the currency. As the central bank provides the ultimate unit of account, that trust is grounded on confidence in the central bank itself. Like the legal system and other foundational state functions, the trust engendered by the central bank has the attributes of a public good. Such "central bank public goods" underpin the monetary system.

Central banks are accountable public institutions that play a pivotal role in payment systems, both wholesale and retail. They supply the ultimate means of payment for banks bank reserves , and a highly convenient and visible one for the public cash.

Moreover, in their roles as operators, overseers and catalysts, they pursue key public interest objectives in the payments sphere: safety, integrity, efficiency and access see glossary.

The central bank plays four key roles in pursuit of these objectives. The first is to provide the unit of account in the monetary system.

From that basic promise, all other promises in the economy follow. Second, central banks provide the means for ensuring the finality of wholesale payments by using their own balance sheets as the ultimate means of settlement, as also reflected in legal concepts of finality see glossary. The central bank is the trusted intermediary that debits the account of the payer and credits the account of the payee. Once the accounts are debited and credited in this way, the payment is final and irrevocable.

The third function is to ensure that the payment system works smoothly. To this end, the central bank provides sufficient settlement liquidity so that no logjams will impede the workings of the payment system, where a payment is delayed because the sender is waiting for incoming funds. At times of stress, the central bank's role in liquidity provision takes on a more urgent form as the lender of last resort. The central bank's fourth role is to oversee the payment system's integrity, while upholding a competitive level playing field.

As overseer, the central bank imposes requirements on the participants so that they support the functioning of the payment system as a whole. Many central banks also have a role in the supervision and regulation of commercial banks, which are the core participants of the payment system. Prudential regulation and supervision reinforce the system. Further, in performing this role, central bank money is "neutral", ie provided on an equal basis to all commercial parties with a commitment to competitive fairness.

Central bank digital currencies should be viewed in the context of these functions of the central bank in the monetary system. Wholesale CBDCs are for use by regulated financial institutions.

They build on the current two-tier structure, which places the central bank at the foundation of the payment system while assigning customer-facing activities to PSPs. The central bank grants accounts to commercial banks and other PSPs, and domestic payments are settled on the central bank's balance sheet. Wholesale CBDCs are intended for the settlement of interbank transfers and related wholesale transactions, for example to settle payments between financial institutions.

They could encompass digital assets or cross-border payments. Wholesale CBDCs and central bank reserves operate in a very similar way. Settlement is made by debiting the account of the bank that has net obligations to the rest of the system and crediting the account of the bank that has a net claim on the system. An additional benefit of settlement in wholesale CBDCs is to allow for new forms of the conditionality of payments, requiring that a payment only settles on condition of delivery of another payment or delivery of an asset.

Retail CBDCs modify the conventional two-tier monetary system in that they make central bank digital money available to the general public, just as cash is available to the general public as a direct claim on the central bank.

One attribute of retail CBDCs is that they do not entail any credit risk for payment system participants, as they are a direct claim on the central bank Graph III.

A retail CBDC is akin to a digital form of cash, the provision of which is a core responsibility of central banks. Other forms of digital retail money represent a claim on an intermediary. Such intermediaries could experience illiquidity due to temporary lack of funds or even insolvency, which could also lead to payment outages.

While such risks are already substantially reduced through collateralisation and other safeguards in most cases, retail CBDCs would put an end to any residual risk. One option makes for a cash-like design, allowing for so-called token-based access and anonymity in payments. This option would give individual users access to the CBDC based on a password-like digital signature using private-public key cryptography, without requiring personal identification.

The other approach is built on verifying users' identity "account-based access" and would be rooted in a digital identity scheme. These issues are intimately tied to broader policy debates on data governance and privacy, which we return to in a later section. From the public interest perspective, the crucial issue for the payment system is how the introduction of retail CBDCs will affect data governance, the competitive landscape of the PSPs and the industrial organisation of the broader payments industry.

In this connection, the experience of jurisdictions with a long history of operating retail FPS provides some useful lessons. Central banks can enhance the functioning of the monetary system by facilitating the entry of new players to foster private sector innovation in payment services. These goals could be achieved by creating open payment platforms that promote competition and innovation, ensuring that the network effects are channelled towards a virtuous circle of greater competition and better services.

Wholesale CBDCs are intended for the settlement of interbank transfers and related wholesale transactions. They serve the same purpose as reserves held at the central bank but with additional functionality. One example is the conditionality of payments, whereby a payment only settles if certain conditions are met. This could encompass a broad variety of conditional payment instructions, going far beyond today's delivery-versus-payment mechanism in real-time gross settlement RTGS systems.

In effect, wholesale CBDCs could make central bank money programmable, to support automation and mitigate risks. Further, wholesale CBDCs would be implemented on new technology stacks. This clean-slate approach would let wholesale CBDC systems be designed with international standards in mind to support interoperability.

This project demonstrates the feasibility of settling digital assets in central bank money. Both PoCs were found to be functionally feasible, and transfers were shown to be legally robust and final. Each PoC presents different practical and operational benefits and challenges. Rules and standards that promote good data governance are among the key elements in establishing and maintaining open markets and a competitive level playing field.

These can yield concrete economic benefits. The BIS Annual Economic Report drew a contrast between "walled gardens", where users are served in a closed proprietary network, and a public town square in which buyers and sellers can meet without artificial barriers. In return for access to all buyers, the sellers must stick to the standards set by the public authorities with a view to promoting the virtuous circle of greater participation and better services.

The analogy with the payment system is that the market stallholders in the public town square are like PSPs, each offering basic payment functionality with their particular bundle of services, such as banking, e-commerce, messaging and social media. Just as the market stallholders must stick to the standards laid down by the town authorities, these PSPs must adhere to various technical standards and data access requirements.

These include technical standards such as application programming interfaces APIs that impose a common format for data exchange from service providers see Box III.

Together with data governance frameworks that assign ownership of data to users, these standards ensure interoperability of the services between PSPs so that they can work seamlessly for the user. AIS allow users to "port" data on their transactions from one provider to another. For instance, a user who has accounts with two different banks can open the app of one bank to check the balances in the other. PIS allow a user to operate the app of one PSP to make an outgoing payment from the account of another.

An application programming interface API, see glossary acts as a digital communication interface between service providers and their users. In its simplest form, a modern payment API first takes a request from an authorised user eg a user who wants to send a friend money through a mobile banking app. It then sends the request to a server to obtain information eg the friend's bank account details or the sender's account balance. Finally, it reports the retrieved information back to the user the money has been sent.

APIs ensure the secure exchange of data and instructions between parties in digital interactions. Through encryption, they allow only the parties directly involved in a transaction to access the information transmitted.

They accomplish this by ensuring proper authentication verifying the credentials of the parties involved, eg from a digital ID, as discussed further in a later section and authorisation which specifies the resources a user is authorised to access or modify. Crucially, APIs can be set up to transmit only data relevant to a specific transaction. For example, a bank may provide an API that allows other banks to request the full name of the holder of a specific account, based on the account number provided.

But this API will not allow the querying bank to retrieve the account holder's home address or transaction history. Insofar as APIs provide strong security features, they can add an additional layer of security to interactions. A key benefit of APIs is that they enable interoperability between different providers and simplify transactions. For example, many large financial institutions or big techs possess valuable consumer data, eg on payment transactions.

By allowing other market participants to access and analyse data in order to develop and improve their products, APIs ensure a level playing field.

This promotes competition and delivers benefits to consumers. An example is "open banking", which allows third-party financial service providers to access transaction and other financial data from traditional financial institutions through APIs. For example, a fintech could use banks' transaction data to assess credit risk and offer a loan at lower, more transparent rates than those offered by traditional financial institutions.

Payment APIs may offer software that allows organisations to create interoperable digital payment services to connect customers, merchants, banks and other financial providers. Eva Witesman PHD. Associate Professor. Romney Institute of Public Service and Ethics. Brigham Young University.

Jill Piacitelli MBA. Ballard Center for Social Impact. Samantha Giacobozzi MPA. Director of Leadership Development and Support.

The HadaNou Collective. Meet the Cohorts. Cohort 1: Fall Anne Sophie Ranjbar. David Smith. David Tensmeyer. Jonathan Hardy. Megan Brewster. Shannon Ellsworth. JoDell Davidson. Malissa McKay. April Baek. Cohort 2: Winter Ann Johnston. Ben Johns. Heidi Phelon.

Julius Ha. Noble Hwang. Rachel Draper. Adam Pulsipher. Adrienne Ventura. Susnnah Hofheins. Ryan Ham. Cohort 3: Fall Rachel Woerner. Theary Leng. Annalee Zeidner. Bruno Santos. Gregory Hutchins.